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AbstractAter a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief,
the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of
sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long
been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the
results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has
pushed this thesis further, oﬀering various strong principles that ultimately result
in a wholesale reduction of iterated to one-shot revision. he present paper oﬀers
grounds to hold that these principles should be signiicantly weakened and that the
reductionist thesis should ultimately be rejected. Furthermore, the considerations
provided suggest a close connection between the logic of iterated belief change and
the logic of evidential relevance.
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Under which conditions should a particular belief be held ater a sequence of revisions
of one’s world view? Under which conditions should it not? In spite of close to three
decades of research in the inluential programme that is AGM belief revision theory, it
turns out that consensus remains far from being reached on this very elementary issue,
which has come to be commonly known as the ‘problem of iterated revision’.
In recent incarnations of the AGMmodel, the beliefs of a rational agent are modeled
by a so-called doxastic state Ψ. Typically treated as a primitive, Ψ determines a ‘belief
set’ [Ψ], a deductively closed set of sentences, standardly drawn from a propositional,
truth-functional language, that are believed by the agent to be true.1
he operation of belief revision, consisting in the adjustment of Ψ to accommodate
the acquisition of a new belief is represented by a revision function *. his function takes
as an input a pair consisting of a prior doxastic state Ψ and sentence A and outputs the
posterior doxastic stateΨ∗A obtained by revisingΨ by A. Two popular sets of principles
of diachronic rationality, the AGM postulates (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson
1985) and the somewhat more recent Darwiche-Pearl (DP) postulates (Darwiche and
Pearl 1997), provide constraints on the behaviour of the revision function.
1[Ψ] is also alternatively denoted in the literature by ‘Bel(Ψ)’ (in Darwiche & Pearl 1997) or
again ‘pΨq’ ( in Rott 2011).
1
he AGM postulates constrain (a) the composition of the belief set [Ψ ∗ A] resulting
from a single revision of a doxastic stateΨ by a sentence A, on the basis of (b) the compo-
sition of [Ψ]. A well-known representation theorem states that the single-shot revision
dispositions of an AGM-compliant agent can be represented by a complete weak pref-
erence ordering of possible worlds, with the set of maximal A-worlds corresponding to
those worlds in which all and only the sentences in [Ψ ∗ A] are true.2 One noteworthy
fact, which we shall make use of later in the paper, is that single-shot revision disposi-
tions with respect to any truth-functional combinationC of sentences A and B are fully
determined by the restriction of this preference relation to the members of the sets of
maximal A ∧ B-, A ∧ ¬B-, ¬A ∧ B- and ¬A ∧ ¬B-worlds.3
It should be noted that the restrictions imposed fall short of having (b) fully determine
(a). In other words, the AGM postulates are consistent with a violation of the following
reductionist thesis for single revisions:
(RED1) If [Ψ] = [Ψ′], then [Ψ ∗ A] = [Ψ′ ∗ A]
hisprinciplewould entail that the composition of the set ofmaximalworlds determines
the entire preference ordering. here is a broad consensus, however, that RED1 should
be rejected, with Hansson (1992, 531-532) oﬀering a convincing counterexample to the
claim.
One consequence of this permissiveness of the AGM postulates is that they wind up
placing relatively little by way of constraints on the belief set resulting from a sequence
of two or more successive revisions of an initial doxastic state. And indeed, it has been
noted that the AGM postulates remain perfectly consistent with a number of intuitively
problematic sequences of change in view (Darwiche and Pearl op.cit., 5-6).
his observation provides the rationale for the introduction of the DP postulates,
which, in the presence of the AGM postulates, turn out to impose certain constraints
on the relation between (c) the composition of the belief set [(Ψ ∗A) ∗ B] resulting from
a twofold revision ofΨ by A and then B and (d) the composition of the belief sets [Ψ∗C]
resulting from single revisions of Ψ by the various truth-functional combinations C of
A and B. More speciically, one can show that the precise import of these principles, in
the presence of the AGM postulates, amounts to the following:
(DP′) [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] =



[Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], if (i) A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]
[Ψ ∗ B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], if (ii) A,¬A < [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]
[Ψ ∗ B], if (iii) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]
4
his reformulation of the DP postulates tells us that (c) is determined by (d), if and only
if the latter also determines (e) whether [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] includes A, ¬A or neither A nor
2For a presentation of the theorem, see Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991), as well as the related
result in Grove (1988).
3See Appendix, Observation ??. he proof is trivial, but we include it since we are not aware of
its having been provided elsewhere in the literature.
4See Appendix, Observation ??. he appendix also includes a statement of the DP and relevant
AGM postulates.
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¬A. But while the AGM and DP postulates do turn out to also oﬀer some constraints
on the relation between (d) and (e),5 these constraints fall short of having the AGM and
DP postulates jointly entail the following reductionist thesis for two-fold revisions:
(RED2) If [Ψ ∗ C] = [Ψ′ ∗ C], for any truth-functional combination C of A and B,
then [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B]
his principle is clearly weaker than RED1. Indeed, consider an arbitrary A and B and
assume the antecedent of RED2. It follows that [Ψ∗A∧ (B∨¬B)] = [Ψ′ ∗A∧ (B∨¬B)].
On the standard assumption that revision by logically equivalent sentences yields the
same posterior beliefs, this amounts to [Ψ ∗ A] = [Ψ′ ∗ A]. By RED1, we then have the
result that [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required. QED.
Having said that, RED2 remains an extremely substantial thesis. It has as an obvious
consequence the following principle:
(RED3) If [Ψ ∗ C] = [Ψ′ ∗ C], for any C, then [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B]
which amounts, on the assumption that doxastic states are individuated by their be-
haviour under iterated revision, to an identiication of doxastic states with preference
orderings over worlds and a reduction of the problem of iterated revision to that of ind-
ing an appropriate function from preference orderings to preference orderings.6
Unlike RED1, however, RED2 (and hence RED3), appears to be widely endorsed in
the belief revision community, albeit implicitly.7 Indeed, a variety of competing supple-
mentations of the AGM and DP postulates have been loated in the literature that turn
out to entail this condition, ensuring that (d) determines (e) and hence (c). Such supple-
mentations have for instance been oﬀered by proponents of the ‘lexicographic’ (Nayak
1994, Nayak et al 2003), ‘restrained’ (Booth, Chopra andMeyer 2005, Booth andMeyer
2006) and ‘natural’ (Boutilier 1996) approaches to revision. Regarding natural revision,
we have the following requirement:
(NR) (a) A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]
(b) A,¬A < [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if A,¬A < [Ψ ∗ B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]
5hese constraints take the form of two principles. he irst oﬀers a condition that is suﬃcient
to place us in case (i) of DP′, telling us that A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if either A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B <
[Ψ ∗ A]. he second oﬀers a condition that is suﬃcient to place us in case (iii) of DP′, telling us
that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if both ¬A ∈ Cn(B) and ¬B < Cn(∅). See Appendix, Observations ??
and ??. hese are the strongest constraints on the relation between (d) and (e) that we know to be
derivable from the AGM and DP postulates.
6To put things a little more precisely, let us say that (i) Ψ and Ψ′ are k-equivalent iﬀ for any k-
tuple 〈A1, . . . , Ak〉, [(((Ψ ∗A1) ∗ . . .) ∗Ak] = [(((Ψ′ ∗A1) ∗ . . .) ∗Ak] and that (ii) they are equivalent
simpliciter iﬀ there are k-equivalent for all k. RED3 is then the claim that, if two doxastic states
are 1-equivalent (in other words: if they are such that their single-shot revision dispositions are
representable by the same preference ordering), then they are 2-equivalent. What we are eﬀec-
tively noting is that this claim amounts to the following: if two doxastic states are 1-equivalent,
then they are equivalent. We provide a quick proof of this in the appendix–see Observation ??.
7To the best of our knowledge, the present paper oﬀers the irst explicit formulation and critical
discussion of these claims.
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(c) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]
Regarding restrained revision, the proposal is:
(RR) (a) A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if either ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]
(b) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] otherwise
Finally, lexicographic revision is characterised by:
(LR) (a) A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if ¬B < Cn(A)
(b) ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] otherwise 8
hese suggestions all have well known and elegant representations in terms of prefer-
ences over possible worlds. In the case of the lexicographic approach, the posterior
ordering is obtained by replacing the relation between any A-world and ¬A-world by a
relation of strict preference for the former over the latter, whilst preserving the prior re-
lations between all other kinds of pairs of worlds. In the case of the restrained approach,
the transformation proceeds in two steps. First, any prior indiﬀerence relation between
an A-world and an ¬A-world is replaced by a relation of strict preference for the former
over the latter. Secondly, any prior relation between a world in the prior set of most
preferred A-worlds and a world outside of that set is transformed into a relation of strict
preference for the former over the latter. All other prior relations are preserved. Finally,
the natural approach simply makes use of the second step of the restrained approach,
while preserving all remaining prior relations. Figure ??, reproduced from Rott (2009),
oﬀers a clear graphical representation of these mappings.
3
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Figure 1: Preferential representations of three reductionist proposals for iterated revision. he
parallel bands represent equivalence classes of equipreferred worlds, with the order of preference
increasing towards the center. he numerals indicate the ordinal position of the relevant set of
worlds ater revision by A.
However, technically convenient as itmay be, RED2 turns out to be rather implausible
on closer inspection.
8hese are all clear strengthenings of the principles mentioned in footnote 5 above. It is easy to
verify that they are equivalent, in the presence of the DP and AGM postulates, to the correspond-
ing characteristic principles listed in Rott (2009, pp. 278–280). We provide a straightforward
proof of this equivalence in the appendix–see Observation ??.
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Consider irst the case in which the following conditions obtain: (a) ¬A is in [Ψ ∗
B], (b) ¬A is in [Ψ], (c) ¬B is in [Ψ ∗ A], (d) ¬B is in [Ψ] and (e) neither A nor B
are in [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B]. It is easily veriied that these conditions are jointly suﬃcient to
fully determine the single shot revision dispositions of an agent with respect to all truth
functional combinations of A and B, i.e. fully determine the composition of [Ψ ∗C], for
any truth functional combination C of A and B. he proof is trivial: As we noted at the
very start of the paper, such dispositions are fully determined by the restriction of the
preference ordering associated with Ψ to the members of the sets of maximal A ∧ B-,
A∧¬B-, ¬A∧B- and ¬A∧¬B-worlds. Furthermore, conditions (a) to (e) are suﬃcient
to determine the unique corresponding ordering depicted in Figure ??. Indeed, from (b)
and (d), it follows that the members of the set of maximal ¬A ∧ ¬B-worlds are strictly
preferred to themembers of the set ofmaximal¬A∧B-worlds, the set ofmaximal A∧¬B
and the set of maximal A ∧ B-worlds. (a) and (c) ensure that the members of the set of
maximal ¬A∧ B-worlds and the set of maximal A∧¬B-worlds are strictly preferred to
the members of the set of maximal A ∧ B-worlds. Now assume for reductio that either
the members of the set of maximal ¬A∧ B-worlds are strictly preferred to the members
of the set of maximal A ∧ ¬B-worlds or that the converse holds. From the former, it
would follow that B is in [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B], while from the latter, it would follow that A is in
that set, in both cases contrary to (e). QED.
AB AB
AB
AB
(a) Examples 1 and 2
AB AB
AB
AB
(b) Examples 3 and 4
Figure 2: Preferential representation of the single shot revision dispositions with respect to all
truth-functional combinations of A and B in Examples 1 to 4. ‘AB’, ‘AB’, ‘AB’ and ‘AB’ represent
the worlds in the sets of maximal A ∧ B-, ¬A ∧ B-, A ∧ ¬B- and ¬A ∧ ¬B- worlds, respectively.
As in the previous igure, the most preferred worlds are situated in the innermost band.
he following pair of examples, however, suggests that such a proile of dispositions
is insuﬃcient to determine whether a sequence of revisions of Ψ by A and then by B
would leave one believing that A or believing that ¬A:
Example 1: I was told a couple of days ago that there is a party being thrown
this weekend and that my friends Sam and Pam are invited. Initially unsure
as to whether either would be tempted to attend, I have now heard that the
venue is located far out of town, probably too far to really be worth the trip
for either of them. I also believe that Sam and Pam do not get on and are
unlikely to attend the same party.
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Example 2: As in Example 1, save that I believe that Sam and Pam have
never met and know nothing about each other.
Let ‘A’ stand for the proposition that Pam will attend the party and ‘B’ stand for the
proposition that Sam will do so. he following is true in both Example 1 and Example
2: First of all, I initially believe that neither Sam nor Pam will attend (¬A and ¬B are
both in [Ψ]). Secondly, were I to come to believe of either Pam or Sam that they will
attend, my initial grounds for thinking that the other will not would still hold: the venue
would be no closer to town and the person attending would presumably need some
special reason to want to go the extra mile (¬A is in [Ψ ∗ B] and ¬B is in [Ψ ∗ A]).
Finally, were I to come to believe that at least one of the two will attend, I would not
feel in a position to determine which (neither A nor B are in [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B]). So in both
examples, my beliefs satisfy conditions (a) to (e). Additionally, in Example 2, we have A
in [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. Indeed, in this situation, my coming to believe that Sam is attending
has no bearing on my previously acquired belief that Pam will be there. In Example 1,
however, we may well ind ourselves with ¬A in [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. Indeed, it is at the very
least rationally permissible for my belief regarding Sam and Pam’s mutual dislike to be
one that I would be extremely reticent to give up, in particular for it to be one that would
survive successive revisions by A and then by B. In such case, my ultimately coming to
believe that Sam is attendingwouldmakeme changemymind about Pam: I would judge
that Pam will have made other plans ater all. his, however would be inconsistent with
RED2.
For a second type of counterexample with a somewhat similar lavour, consider now
the case in which conditions (b), (d) and (e) above hold, i.e. ¬A and ¬B are both in
[Ψ] and neither A nor B are in [Ψ ∗ A ∨ B], but (a) and (c) do not, so that ¬A is not
in [Ψ ∗ B], nor is ¬B in [Ψ ∗ A]. Again, this suﬃces to determine a proile of single-
shot revision dispositions, depicted in Figure ??. Indeed, as we saw above, (b) and (d)
entail that the members of the set of maximal ¬A ∧ ¬B-worlds are strictly preferred to
the members of the set of maximal ¬A ∧ B-worlds, the set of maximal A ∧ ¬B and the
set of maximal A ∧ B-worlds. We also saw that (e) entails that the members of the set
of maximal ¬A ∧ B-worlds and the members of the set of maximal A ∧ ¬B-worlds are
equipreferred. So assume for reductio that the members of the set of maximal A ∧ B-
worlds are either strictly preferred to the members of the set of maximal ¬A∧ B-worlds
and the set of maximal A ∧¬B-worlds or strictly dispreferred to them. In the irst case,
we would have both A and B in [Ψ∗A∨B], contrary to (e). In the second case, we would
have ¬A in [Ψ ∗ B] and ¬B in [Ψ ∗ A], contrary to our assumption that (a) and (c) are
false. QED.
But here too, a pair of cases shows that the relevant proile of single shot dispositions
is insuﬃcient to determine the outcome of a sequence of revisions of Ψ by A and then
by B. his time, however, we have one case having such a sequence lead to a belief that
A and the other having it lead to a suspension of judgment as to whether or not A:
Example 3: I was told a couple of days ago that a partywas being thrown this
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weekend and that my friends Sam and Pamwere invited. Initially unsure as
towhether either of themwould be tempted to attend, I have nowheard that
the party has been cancelled. Furthermore, I believe that Pam’s relationship
with Sam is somewhat unpredictable and that they avoid each other at all
costs when they are going through a rough patch. I currently have no idea
of the state of their relationship.
Example 4: As in Example 3, save that I believe that Sam and Pam have
never met and know nothing about each other.
he following holds true in both Example 3 and Example 4: Since I think that the party
has been cancelled, I initially believe, as I did in Examples 1 and 2, that neither Sam
nor Pam will attend (¬A and ¬B are both in [Ψ]). In contrast to what was the case in
Examples 1 and 2, however, my coming to believe either of Pam or of Sam that they
will attend would aﬀect my prior grounds for thinking that the other will not. Indeed,
such a change in view would require the belief that the party is not cancelled ater all.
Furthermore, my initial understanding that the party was cancelled constituted my sole
grounds to presume of either invitee that theywould not be attending. Hence, in coming
to believe of one invitee that he or she will attend, I must leave open the possibility that
the other will do so too (¬A is not in [Ψ∗B], nor is¬B in [Ψ∗A]). Finally, as in Examples
1 and 2, were I to come to believe that at least one of the two will attend, I would not
feel in a position to determine whether solely the one would show up, solely the other,
or both together (neither A nor B are in [Ψ ∗A∨ B]). So my doxastic states in Examples
3 and 4 both satisfy conditions (b), (d) and (e) and violate (a) and (c). In Example 4, it
is also the case, as with Example 2, that A is in [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. he situation is diﬀerent,
however, in Example 3, where it is perfectly possible to wind upwith neither A nor¬A in
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. Whether or not this is the case will hinge on the extent to which my belief
regarding the volatile nature of their relationship is deeply entrenched. It is certainly at
least rationally permissible that it should survive the successive revisions by A and then
by B. But if it does, then my coming to believe that Sam is attending will lead me to
suspend judgment as to whether or not Pam is coming along too. Again, RED2 fails.
he root cause of the potential divergence of behaviour under iterated revision be-
tween the cases in each pair appears to be a diﬀerence in the evidential relations that are
perceived to hold between A and B. In Examples 2 and 4, A and B are initially taken to
be entirely evidentially independent and, in particular, B is not taken to undermine A,
i.e. to provide a reason to not believe it. In contrast, in Example 1, B is taken to have a
bearing on the question of whether or not A, indeed, it is taken to provide a suﬃcient
reason to believe ¬A. In Example 3, B is also deemed evidentially pertinent to A, this
being taken to provide a suﬃcient reason to suspend judgment as to whether or not A.
What these pairs of cases demonstrate is that the dispositions that one has to revise one’s
beliefs upon single revisions by diﬀerent truth-functional combinations of A and B are
insuﬃcient to determine one’s attitude to such evidential matters.
While our examples constitute a direct challenge to RED2, the above evidential di-
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agnosis of the underlying issue suggests that the weaker RED3 should also probably be
rejected. Indeed, consider a case in which an agent has an extremely restricted concep-
tual repertoire, limited to combinations of two atomic sentences, A and B, and his or
her single shot revision dispositions are captured by one or the other of the preference
orderings depicted in Figure ??, ordering ?? for example. It seems perfectly open to him
or her to take B to provide a reason to believe ¬A, and hence believe ¬A upon revising
his or her initial beliefs by A and then by B. But it seems equally permissible for him or
her to take A and B to be evidentially independent, thus believing A at the end of this
sequence of revisions. (And indeed, if one or the other of these attitudes were not ratio-
nally acceptable, which one would it be and why?) But if such leeway is granted, then
RED3 cannot hold: the doxastic state of an agentmust be represented by a structure that
is richer than a mere preference ordering over possible worlds.9,10,11
To sum things up succinctly, then, a set of counterexamples shows that progress on
the key issue of iterated revision has been hampered over the past couple of decades by
a tacit commitment to an implausibly strong reductionist claim, in the form of RED2.
hese counterexamples arguably also motivate the rejection somewhat weaker princi-
ple in the form of RED3, suggesting that a preference ordering over the set of possible
worlds provides insuﬃcient structure to represent an agent’s commitments to policies
of iterated revision. Furthermore, what appears to be a credible diagnosis of the situa-
tion suggests that future research on the logic of belief dynamics may be well advised to
9Could one not, in response to this, insist that a restricted version of RED3 nevertheless holds
for agents with more extensive conceptual resources? In principle, sure. But the resulting picture
would strike us as being unappealingly disuniied, with doxastic states being representable by
preference orderings in some cases but only by richer structures in others.
10Robert Stalnaker has also recently voiced suspicions regarding RED3. However, the grounds
that he oﬀers for doubting the principle are insuﬃciently strong. Finding fault with the irst two
Darwiche-Pearl postulates, he ipso facto rejects any reductionist proposal that satisies them, in-
cluding the three proposals that we consider here. But RED3 does not logically require either of
of the postulates that he criticises and the aforementioned proposals do not exhaust the space of
reductiivist options. See Stalnaker (2009).
11We should perhaps mention in passing another potential line of argument from the failure of
RED2 to the failure of RED3: Recall that RED2 asserts that the belief sets resulting from revising
a doxastic state by the diﬀerent truth-functional combinations of A and B jointly determine the
belief sets resulting from sequentially revising that state by A and then by B. But this strong
‘determination’ thesis entails an altogether far weaker ‘consistency’, or again ‘irrelevance’, principle,
namely:
(IR) If [Ψ ∗ C] = [Ψ′ ∗ C], for any truth functional combination C of A and B, then there
exists aΨ′′, such that [Ψ′ ∗C] = [Ψ′′ ∗C], for anyC, and [(Ψ∗A)∗B] = [(Ψ′′ ∗A)∗B]
he entailment is obvious: let Ψ′′ = Ψ′. IR, in eﬀect, tells us that, holding ixed one’s single-shot
revision dispositions with respect to sentences that are truth functional combinations of A and B,
one’s single-shot revision dispositions with respect to sentences that are not truth functional com-
binations of A and B are irrelevant to the composition of the belief set resulting from a sequential
revision of one’s doxastic state by A and then by B. It does not strike us as being a unreasonable re-
quirement to impose. It is also one that is perfectly consistent with the examples that we consider.
However, given the latter, it is easy to see that IR entails that RED3 must fail too. See Appendix,
Observation ??.
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attend to the issue of the logic of evidential relevance.
APPENDIX
In the proofs that follow, we shall be appealing to the following principles, which are not
deined in the main body of the paper. hey are to be read as holding for all doxastic
states Ψ and all sentences A, B,C:
(AGM2) A ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]
(AGM3) If B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A], then B ∈ Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A})
(AGM4) If ¬A < [Ψ] and B ∈ Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A}), then B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]
(AGM5) If A is consistent, then [Ψ ∗ A] is also consistent
(AGM7) [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B] ⊆ Cn([Ψ ∗ A] ∪ {B})
(AGM8) If ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A], then Cn([Ψ ∗ A] ∪ {B}) ⊆ [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B]
(DP1) If C ∈ Cn(A), then B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A] iﬀ B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ A]
(DP2) If ¬C ∈ Cn(A), then B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A] iﬀ B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ C) ∗ A]
(DP3) If B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A], then B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ B) ∗ A]
(DP4) If ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A], then ¬B < [(Ψ ∗ B) ∗ A]
Observation 1. An agent’s single-shot revision dispositions with respect to any truth-
functional combination C of sentences A and B are fully determined by the restriction
of the preference relation to the members of the sets of maximal A∧ B-, A∧¬B-, ¬A∧ B-
and ¬A ∧ ¬B-worlds.
Proof of Observation ??. Let  be a complete weak ordering of the set W of possible
worlds and ≻ its strict part. Let JψK denote {w ∈ W : w |= ψ} and, where S ⊆ W ,
max(S ) denote {x ∈ S : For all y ∈ S , x  y}. Since C is a truth-functional combi-
nation of A and B, the set JCK will be equal to the union of one or more of the cells
of the partition P = {JA ∧ BK, JA ∧ ¬BK, J¬A ∧ BK, J¬A ∧ ¬BK} of W . We now show
that x ∈ max(JCK) iﬀ x ∈ max(⋃{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK}), the nature of this
last set being determined, as required, by the restriction of the preference relation to the
members of the sets of maximal A ∧ B-, A ∧ ¬B-, ¬A ∧ B- and ¬A ∧ ¬B-worlds.
Regarding the let-to-right direction: Assume that x ∈ max(JCK). Now assume for re-
ductio that x < max(⋃{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK}). Now either (i) x ∈ ⋃{max(S ) :
S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK} or (ii) x < ⋃{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK}. Assume (i). hen
there exists a y in max(⋃{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK}), such that y ≻ x. Since
max(
⋃
{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK}) ⊆ JCK, we also have y ∈ JCK, contradicting our
initial assumption. So assume (ii). Since P partitions JCK, there exists an S ∈ P such
that x ∈ S . Given (ii), we know that x < max(S ). So there exists a y ∈ max(S ) such that
y ≻ x. Since S ⊆ JCK, we also have y ∈ JCK, again contradicting our initial assumption.
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Regarding the right-to-let direction: Assume that x ∈ max(⋃{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆
JCK}). Assume for reductio that x < max(JCK) and hence that there exists a y ∈ JCK
such that y ≻ x. Since P partitions JCK, there exists an S ∈ P such that y ∈ S and a
z ∈ max(S ) such that z  y. But since x ∈ max(⋃{max(S ) : S ∈ P and S ⊆ JCK}), we
have x  z and hence, by transitivity of , x  y. Contradiction. 
Observation 2. In the presence of the AGMpostulates, theDP postulates are jointly equiv-
alent to DP′.
Proof of Observation ??. Regarding the let-to-right direction: We consider three cases:
(1) SupposeA ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B]. hen, byAGM7andAGM8, it follows that [(Ψ∗A)∗B] =
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ A ∧ B]. But from DP1, we know that [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ A ∧ B] = [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B].
Hence [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], as required.
(2) Suppose A,¬A < [(Ψ∗A)∗B]. By AGM8, this gives [(Ψ∗A)∗B] ⊆ [(Ψ∗A)∗¬A∧
B] ∩ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ A ∧ B] while the converse inclusion to this also holds by AGM7.
Hence [(Ψ∗A)∗B] = [(Ψ∗A)∗¬A∧B]∩[(Ψ∗A)∗A∧B]. Applying DP1 andDP2
to the right-hand side yields [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ ¬A∧ B]∩ [Ψ ∗ A∧ B]. We now
split into two cases: (i) ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] and (ii) ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B]. Assume (i). It follows
that [Ψ ∗ ¬A ∧ B] = [Ψ ∗ B] and we recover the desired conclusion. Assume (ii).
then we also have A < [Ψ ∗ B] from DP3 and the fact that A < [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B].
Hence, by AGM8 and AGM7, we have [Ψ ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ ¬A ∧ B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B].
Hence [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B]. But since [Ψ ∗ B] ⊆ [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], we have
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B] ∩ [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], as required.
(3) Suppose ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. hen, by AGM7 and AGM8, [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] =
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ ¬A ∧ B]. By DP2, we have [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ ¬A ∧ B] = [Ψ ∗ ¬A ∧ B] and so
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ ¬A ∧ B]. From ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] and DP4 we know that
¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B]. Hence, by AGM7 and AGM8, we have [Ψ ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ ¬A∧ B] and
so [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B], as required.
Regarding the right-to-let direction:
(1) Regarding DP1: If A ∈ Cn(B), then we must be in Case (i) of DP′ and so [(Ψ ∗
A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B]. Since A ∧ B and B are logically equivalent, we know that
[Ψ ∗ A ∧ B] = [Ψ ∗ B] and so [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B].
(2) Regarding DP2: If ¬A ∈ Cn(B), then we must be in Case (iii) of DP′, which
immediately gives us [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B].
(3) Regarding DP3: We prove the contrapositive. Assume A < [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. If
¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], then [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B] from Clause (iii) of DP′ and so
A < [Ψ∗B], as required. If¬A < [(Ψ∗A)∗B], then [(Ψ∗A)∗B] = [Ψ∗A∧B]∩[Ψ∗B]
by Clause (ii) of DP′. We know that A ∈ [Ψ ∗ A∧ B], so if A < [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], then
we must have A < [Ψ ∗ B], again as required.
10
(4) Regarding DP4: If ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], then we must be in Case (iii) of DP′, so
[(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B] and hence ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B]. 
Observation 3. AGM2, AGM4 andDP3 jointly entail that A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B] if A ∈ [Ψ∗B]
or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A].
Proof of Observation ??. Assume that ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]. By AGM2, A ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. It then
follows by AGM4 that A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. Assume that A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B]. It follows by DP3
that A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. 
Observation 4. AGM2 entails that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] if ¬A ∈ Cn(B) and ¬B < Cn(∅).
Proof of Observation ??. Trivial: Assume that ¬A ∈ Cn(B) and that ¬B < Cn(∅). From
the latter, by AGM2, we have B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. By deductive closure of belief sets, and
the fact that ¬A ∈ Cn(B), it then follows from this that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B]. 
Observation 5. he following two statements are equivalent:
(1) If two doxastic states are 1-equivalent, then they are 2-equivalent
(2) If two doxastic states are 1-equivalent, then they are equivalent
Proof of Observation ??. Clearly (2) entails (1), from the deinitions of equivalence and
k-equivalence. It remains to show that (1) entails (2). So suppose that (a) holds and
that Ψ and Ψ′ are 1-equivalent. We will show by induction on k that Ψ and Ψ′ are k-
equivalent for all k. he base case, k = 1, holds by assumption. Regarding the inductive
step, assume that Ψ and Ψ′ are k-equivalent. We need to show that they are are (k + 1)-
equivalent, i.e. that for any (k+ 1)-tuple 〈A1, A2, . . . , Ak, Ak+1〉, [((((Ψ ∗ A1) ∗ A2) ∗ . . .) ∗
Ak) ∗ Ak+1] = [((((Ψ
′ ∗ A1) ∗ A2) ∗ . . .) ∗ Ak) ∗ Ak+1]. SinceΨ andΨ′ are k-equivalent, we
know that [(((Ψ∗A1)∗A2)∗. . .)∗Ak−1] and [(((Ψ′∗A1)∗A2)∗. . .)∗Ak−1] are 1-equivalent.
Hence, by (1), they are also 2-equivalent and so [((((Ψ ∗ A1) ∗ A2) ∗ . . .) ∗ Ak) ∗ Ak+1] =
[((((Ψ′ ∗ A1) ∗ A2) ∗ . . .) ∗ Ak) ∗ Ak+1], as required. 
Observation 6. In the presence of the AGM and DP postulates, NR, RR and LR are re-
spectively equivalent to
(NR′) [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] =



[Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], if ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]
[Ψ ∗ B], otherwise
(RR′) [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] =



[Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], if ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]
[Ψ ∗ B], otherwise
(LR′) [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] =



[Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], if K ∗ A ∧ B is consistent
[Ψ ∗ B], otherwise
Proof of Observation ??. Regarding the equivalence between NR and NR′:
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- FromNR toNR′: Assume¬B < [Ψ∗A]. It follows byNR that A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B]. By
DP′, we then recover [(Ψ∗A)∗B] = [Ψ∗A∧B], as required. Assume¬B ∈ [Ψ∗A].
Now either (i) ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B], or (ii) ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B]. Assume (i). hen, by NR,
¬A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B] and hence, by DP′, [(Ψ∗A)∗B] = [Ψ∗B], as required. Assume
(ii). On the one hand, it follows by AGM8 that Cn([Ψ∗B]∪{A}) ⊆ [Ψ∗A∧B] and
hence that (iii) [Ψ ∗ B] ⊆ [Ψ ∗ A∧ B]. On the other hand, it it follows by NR that
A,¬A < [(Ψ∗A)∗B] and hence, byDP′, that (iv) [(Ψ∗A)∗B] = [Ψ∗A∧B]∩[Ψ∗B].
By (iii) and (iv), we have [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B], as required.
- From NR′ to NR: Assume that A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]. From the latter, by
NR′, we recover [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B] and hence, by AGM2 and closure of
belief sets, A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required. Assume that ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. From this,
by NR′, we recover [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B]. Assume further that A,¬A < [Ψ ∗ B].
It follows that A,¬A < [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required. Finally, alternatively, assume
that ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B]. It follows that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], again as required.
Regarding the equivalence between RR and RR′:
- From RR to RR′: Assume that either ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]. By RR,
we have A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] and hence, by DP′, [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B], as
required. Assume instead that ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] and ¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. By RR, we have
¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] and hence, by DP′, [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B], as required.
- From RR′ to RR: Assume that either ¬A < [Ψ ∗ B] or ¬B < [Ψ ∗ A]. By RR′ it
follows that [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B] = [Ψ ∗A∧B] and hence, by AGM2 and closure of belief
sets, that A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required. So assume instead that ¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B] and
¬B ∈ [Ψ ∗ A]. It follows by RR′ that [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B] and hence, since
¬A ∈ [Ψ ∗ B], that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required.
Regarding the equivalence between LR and LR′:
- From LR to LR′: Assume that [Ψ ∗ A∧ B] is consistent. By AGM2, it follows that
¬B < Cn(A) and hence, by LR, that A ∈ [(Ψ∗A)∗B]. By DP′, we then recover the
required result that [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ A∧ B]. Assume instead that [Ψ ∗ A∧ B]
is inconsistent. By AGM5, it follows that ¬B ∈ Cn(A). By LR, we therefore have
¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] and hence, by DP′, [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ B], as required.
- From LR′ to LR: Assume that ¬B < Cn(A). It follows, by AGM5, that [Ψ ∗ A∧ B]
is consistent. and hence, by LR′, that [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [Ψ ∗ A ∧ B]. By AGM2
and closure of belief sets, we then recover A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required. Assume
instead that ¬B ∈ Cn(A). Since, by AGM2, we have B ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], it then
follows by closure of belief sets that ¬A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B], as required. 
Observation 7. RED3, IR and the negation of RED2 are jointly inconsistent.
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Proof of Observation ??. Assume the negation of RED2, i.e. that there exist sentences A
and B and doxastic statesΨ andΨ′, such that [Ψ∗C] = [Ψ′∗C], for any truth-functional
combination C of A and B, but [(Ψ ∗ A) ∗ B] , [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B]. By IR, there then exists a
Ψ
′′ such that [Ψ′′ ∗C] = [Ψ′ ∗C], for anyC, and [(Ψ′′ ∗A)∗B] = [(Ψ∗A)∗B]. Since, by
assumption, [(Ψ∗A)∗B] , [(Ψ′∗A)∗B], we therefore have [(Ψ′′∗A)∗B] , [(Ψ′∗A)∗B].
But this contradicts RED3, which would require, since [Ψ′′ ∗ C] = [Ψ′ ∗ C], for any C,
that [(Ψ′′ ∗ A) ∗ B] = [(Ψ′ ∗ A) ∗ B]. 
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